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1. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the incentive implications of performance measures used in remuneration contracts 
has become vital since the rapid introduction of performance-based compensation schemes in the 
last three decades. The classic principal-agent model acknowledges that the noise of a given 
performance measure determines its suitability for use in compensation contracts. The “noisier” the 
measure, the lower is the optimal incentive intensity. However, as Baker (2002) points out, the 
critical issue in most incentive contracts may not be the noisiness of the performance measure, but 
rather its “distortion”. Baker defines distortion inversely as the extent to which the effect of effort 
on measured performance is aligned with the effect of effort on the firm’s objective function.1   
If a performance measure is “distorted”, then agents can increase their performance 
outcomes in two ways: by engaging in productive activities that are intended by the principal or by 
engaging in unintended actions that are easier or cheaper from the agent’s perspective. Performance 
pay based on a distorted performance measure will thus motivate agents to put costly effort into 
‘cheap’ activities (increasing measured performance) to the possible detriment of organizational 
value. Such unproductive efforts are typically referred to as ‘gaming efforts’ (see Courty and 
Marschke, 2008).  
Performance measures are often assessed and chosen based on their correlation with firm 
value (see Baker, 2002; Courty and Marschke, 2008). However, some measures that seem to be 
informative ex ante about the performance of the company become less informative when used for 
incentive purposes, revealing their distortion. Implementing a compensation scheme based on such 
distorted measures undermines the association between the measure and the value of the company. 
Put differently, the mere use of a distorted performance measure in compensation degrades its 
quality as a measure of intended performance. The degree of (potential) degradation depends on 
the extent to which the measure is distorted. Thus, the suitability of a performance measure cannot 
                                                 
1 Theoretical multi-tasking models show an inverse relationship between the distortion of the performance measure and the 
efficient incentive intensity (see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Feltham and Xie, 1994; Datar et al., 2001; Baker, 2002). 
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be measured by the ex ante correlation between the measure and the value of the company, as this 
correlation disregards the distortion not yet revealed.  
  An example involves the distortion of the performance measure “client satisfaction” when 
it is used in compensation schemes for sales employees. Client satisfaction, used as a performance 
measure, may provide valuable information about a sales employee’s contribution to company 
performance. Using the measure as a basis for performance pay, however, creates an incentive for a 
sales employee to increase client satisfaction through ‘cheap’ effort: selling at low prices, for 
example, or even giving products away for free. The performance measure “client satisfaction” thus 
becomes degraded: it is less useful than originally expected as a basis for performance pay.  
  Courty and Marschke (2008) developed an empirical test to detect distortion. Their test, 
based on a simple theoretical framework, assesses how a performance measure degrades when it is 
first used in a compensation contract or when its use in such a contract is intensified. The focus is 
on measuring the change in the association between the performance measure and organizational 
value due to an increase in the weight of the measure in the compensation scheme. A negative 
change indicates degradation of the quality of the measure, revealing a distortion. Courty and 
Marschke apply their test to performance measures introduced in the course of a natural 
experiment among agencies managing the US Governmental Job Training Partnership Act. They 
find weak support for the distortion of these measures. 
  This paper applies the Courty and Marschke (2008) approach to test for distortions in the 
performance measure Residual Income (RI), a key indicator of corporate performance. More 
specifically, we collected a sample of firms that have introduced the Residual Income based 
performance measure Economic Value Added (EVA) in the remuneration contract of executive 
board members. EVA was developed and copyrighted by Stern Stewart & Co. Unlike RI, EVA 
cannot be measured solely on the basis of firms’ accounting data. It differs from Residual Income 
due to some —for researchers opaque— discretionary and standard adjustments. In our empirical 
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analysis we measure RI for the firms in our sample and refer to this as the accounting based value of 
EVA.2 
  Unlike Courty and Marschke, the application in this paper does not concern a natural 
experiment, but reviews the experience of listed (US-based) firms that introduced this popular 
performance measure to reward management performance, mostly in the mid-nineties. This non-
experimental approach requires adapting the empirical Courty and Marschke test in order to address 
self-selection and to account for possible (systematic) changes in economic circumstances in the 
period studied. To this end, we apply a difference-in-differences approach and compare firms that 
adopted EVA with their non-adopter counterparts, before and after the boards of the former firms 
selected EVA as the performance measure in their employee compensation schemes. The results of 
this study indicate that the accounting based version of the company performance measure EVA is 
a distorted performance measure that can be gamed. 
  Our findings should not be interpreted as showing that EVA is a poor performance 
measure. It may well be the case that EVA is less distorted than most, if not all, alternative 
measures used in corporate practice. Our results only show that EVA is not first best, as it can be 
manipulated. Because this is likely to hold for all performance measures that can be realistically used 
in practice, 3 EVA may actually well be second best. We will return to this in the conclusion. 
  The contribution of this study is twofold. First, it empirically assesses the distortion of a 
widely used performance measure in the remuneration packages of executive board members. 
Second, the paper extends the Courty and Marschke test for distortions in performance measures 
to accommodate the potential endogeneity in the selection of performance measures (in this case, 
                                                 
2 We will discuss the differences between RI and EVA, and the possible consequences of these differences for our analysis, 
in Section 3. Using EVA data obtained from Stern Stewart is not possible in our application (see Section 3). 
3 In the words of Murphy (2012, p. 38) “Conceptually, the “perfect” performance measure for a CEO is the CEO’s 
personal contribution to the value of the firm.  Unfortunately […]  the available measures will inevitably exclude ways that 
the CEO creates value, and include the effects of factors not due to the efforts of the CEO, or fail to reveal ways that the 
CEO destroys value. The challenge in designing incentive plans is to select performance measures that capture important 
aspects of the CEO’s contributions to firm value, while recognizing that all performance measures are imperfect and create 
unintended side effects.” 
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EVA), so that it can be used in non-experimental settings. This is important because it is rarely the 
case that economists can get data from a truly experimental setting.  Thus, our difference-in-
differences approach to their test is of general applicability to real-world incentive contracts.  
 
2. DETECTING DISTORTIONS IN A PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
The test developed by Courty and Marschke (CM) detects distortions by assessing the behavioral 
responses to changed incentives. It requires performance to be observed under (at least) two 
different compensation schemes, where the relative weight attached to the measure under study 
should have increased going from one scheme to the other. Let p1 and p2 therefore denote two 
different performance measures of the agent’s efforts and let V reflect the value of the firm the 
principal is interested in. Assume that at some moment in time (denoted t0) the principal changes 
the incentive weights on p1 and p2 in the agent’s compensation contract from to . 
In particular, assume that the principal introduces p2 (i.e. ), instead of no measure at all, 
or an alternative performance measure p1 used before (i.e. ). As a result, the relative 
weight 2/1 on performance measure two increases. This corresponds to the situation studied in 
our empirical analysis, where sample firms introduced EVA (=p2) to replace their existing 
performance measure(s) (=p1). 
  Courty and Marschke show that p2 is distorted if the statistical association between p2 and 
V decreases upon an increase in the relative weight 2/1. Here, statistical association can be 
measured either by the correlation between p2 and V, or by the slope coefficient of regressing V on 
p2. If distortion is detected, it can be of two different kinds. First, the performance measure may 
induce the agent to exert (more) productive effort, but in the wrong quantities, because effort is 
imperfectly valued at the margin. Second, the agent may be motivated to undertake unproductive 
actions that increase the value of the performance measure and thus his reward, but are detrimental 
to firm value (gaming). Courty and Marschke show that the two types of distortion can be 
1 2( , ) 
/ /
1 '2( , ) 
/
2 2 0  
/
1 1 0  
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distinguished based on the direction of changes in the covariance between p2 and V, but only if the 
additional assumption is made that overall incentives are not weakened over time. In that case, a 
decrease in the covariance between p2 and V is conclusive evidence of gaming. Our empirical 
analysis therefore uses the following two test criteria developed by CM:  
 
(CM.1) Performance measure p2 is distorted if Corr(p2,V) decreases upon an increase in the relative 
weight (2/1) of this measure in the contract; 
(CM.2) If , then a decrease in Cov(p2,V) upon an increase in (2/1) implies a 
gaming distortion in performance measure p2. 
 
The CM test is based on the assumption that changes in the levels of association between p2 and V 
are solely caused by changes in the agent’s effort choices. In their experimental setting, this 
assumption is likely to hold. In practice, however, there may be confounding factors.  
  To address this issue of confounding factors in our non-experimental setting, we compose 
control groups to benchmark the results of the firms that adopted EVA (=p2). Firms are matched: 
each firm in the treatment group (using newly introduced EVA from time t0 onwards as the (sole) 
performance measure in the board’s compensation contract) is matched with a comparable firm in 
the control group (using neither EVA nor any similar measure in the time span studied before and 
after t0). Comparing the changes in association in the treatment group to those in the control group 
allows us to identify changes caused by altered effort incentives (assuming that changes in other 
factors are similar for treatment and control firms). We thus use a difference-in-differences 
approach to the CM tests described above.  
  We set up two control samples. The first matches treatment firms to firms of the same 
size and industry class. This control group is able to mitigate the bias resulting from changes in 
(economic) circumstances. The second control group is set up to mitigate the endogeneity bias due 
to self-selection. The introduction of EVA (or any other performance measure) to reward 
management performance is a deliberate strategic decision—and not based on random assignment. 
/ /
1 2 1 2     
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For example, firms that observe a temporary high correlation between EVA and firm value may be 
especially inclined to adopt EVA for reward purposes. Sheer regression to the mean then results in 
a lower correlation in the period after adoption—even when distortion plays no role at all. Using an 
(alternative) appropriate control group, our difference-in-differences approach addresses these 
confounding factors and can distinguish (self-selection-induced) regression to the mean from 
distortion. 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL APPLICATION TO ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED 
This section discusses the residual income-based performance measure EVA and our empirical 
measure of firm value (that is, relative total shareholder return (RTSR)).  
 
3.1 Residual Income and Economic Value Added 
Economists have long acknowledged that an appropriate measure of value creation for firms 
should be based on the difference between earnings and the costs of capital employed (see 
Hamilton, 1777; Marshall, 1890; Biddle et al., 1997). In the twentieth century, various explicit 
measures of value creation were operationalized. These are called Residual Income (RI) based 
measures. They are often used as a performance indicator of (divisions or entire) firms and used as 
a basis for the reward of board members,  because of their alignment with the main goal of for-
profit organizations (that is, to add value to the owners’ wealth in excess of their opportunity costs). 
  Residual income is defined as net operating profits after tax (NOPAT), minus a charge for 
invested capital.4 This capital charge equals the firm’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC), 
times the amount of capital employed. The WACC essentially weighs the minimally required return 
on equity and the required interest rate on debt according to the relative equity and debt levels in 
the financial structure of the company. Residual income is operationalized as follows: 
 
 RI = NOPAT – WACC  Capital Employed.      (1) 
                                                 
4 Here, operating profits are profits before deducting the after-tax costs of interest expenses to debt holders. 
  9  
  
In the 1980s, Stern Stewart & Co. developed and trademarked a version of residual 
income, labeled Economic Value Added (EVA), which made some adjustments to RI, both 
standard and discretionary.5 EVA became a very popular management tool for measuring 
company performance and a basis for the remuneration of board members. Many companies, 
such as Eli Lilly and Polaroid, started using EVA measures in their executive bonus schemes 
around the mid 1990s, the mean (median) year of introduction is 1995 (1996). Because of the fact 
that EVA was such a popular performance measure that is believed to be relatively undistorted, 
we decided to apply the CM test to companies who have adopted this measure in comparison to 
non-adopters.  
There are two additional motivations for studying a sample of EVA-adopters. First, 
EVA adopters predominantly use EVA as the sole measure in the board’s (short-term) incentive 
plan, due to the strong recommendation by Stern Stewart to do so (Stewart, 1991). The sole use 
of EVA is necessary given the assumptions of the model and the tractability of their validity, see 
Section 2. Second, adopting EVA as a RI based measure in the compensation plan is a 
deliberate, radical and significant change, supervised by a professional company, i.e., Stern 
Stewart. This radical and significant shift is also vital given the difference-in-differences approach 
we adopt.  
Given these attractive features of the sample of EVA –adopters for our current purpose, 
we prefer the study of that group compared to the wider group of all companies that adopt an RI-
based measure of any other kind in ways that are less uniform. Nevertheless, the focus of our 
empirical analysis is the accounting-based value of EVA that omits the (standard and discretionary) 
adjustments, see below. Thus, we effectively study the effect of adopting RI as a performance 
                                                 
5 Biddle et al. (1997, p. 306) provide a long list of examples of these adjustments, including the capitalization and 
amortization of research and development and certain marketing costs, adding the change in bad debt allowances and 
subtracting marketable securities and construction in progress. See also Young (1999) for an elaborate discussion. 
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measure in the CEO’s compensation contract for the selection of firms that claim to have started 
using a particular form of it, i.e. the trademarked version named EVA.   
The early average adoption year, together with the required long time series of data before 
(and after) the introduction of EVA and the unavailability of Stern Stewart adjustments earlier 
than 1990, compels us to apply the accounting-based value of EVA as defined in equation (1) and 
to refrain from the Stern Stewart adjustments in our empirical tests. We acknowledge that the 
adjusted value of EVA may differ from the accounting-based EVA calculation in equation (1). 
Yet we expect these differences to be of relatively minor importance for our analysis. First, in 
practice the typical EVA-adopter only makes a few of these adjustments, if at all (see Malmi and 
Ikaheimo, 2003; Martin and Perry, 2000; Young, 1999; Young and O’Byrne. 2001). Second, as 
Biddle et al. (1997, p. 314) show, the correlation between EVA based on the published numbers 
by Stern Stewart and the accounting-based value of EVA amounts to 0.90. Anderson et al (2005) 
similarly obtain a strong relationship between unadjusted and adjusted EVA. Third, Wallace 
(1997, section 4.6.2) finds that the effect of an EVA-based compensation plan on managers’ 
behavior is independent of these adjustments to earnings.6  
We measure the three ingredients of accounting based EVA in equation (1) as follows. 
NOPAT is the operating profit that accrues to shareholders and debt holders, and was obtained 
from the Thompson Worldscope database in the following two ways: 
 
 NOPATa = Operating Profit   (1 – Tax Rate)      (2a) 
 NOPATb = Operating Profit - Taxes paid (received)      (2b) 
 
                                                 
6 Our approach of ignoring EVA-adjustments would potentially be problematic if these adjustments varied 
systematically across companies (with characteristics that go together) with different levels of RTSR.. We are not aware 
of  any empirical evidence supporting (or undermining) this case.  
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While in theory both approaches would logically yield the same result, they are, in practice, slightly 
distinct.7 This study takes the average of the two and reports the results obtained when using 
either one of these definitions on its own in a separate robustness check in online Appendix B.  
  The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is determined by the investors’ required rate 
of return, which is not directly observable. Various judgmental decisions and arbitrary choices are 
involved when calculating the WACC, possibly leading to large variations.8 Therefore, 
remuneration committees of virtually all companies use predetermined or ‘pre-calculated’ WACC 
levels. Following their practice, we adopt a commonly used flat WACC level of 10 percent. In our 
robustness check we include the other commonly used WACC levels of 12 and 8 percent in 
determining EVA (Stark and Thomas, 1998).9 
  The amount of Capital Employed is proxied by the average annual book value of total assets 
employed by the company, based on accounting data taken from the WorldScope database. The 
average is calculated by taking the average of the year end and year start values. 
  Stewart (1991) and Stern et al. (1995) posit that an EVA-based bonus plan should be 
based on incremental increases (or the improvement in EVA), such that mere company size does 
                                                 
7 For example, negative tax rates are not revealed in the Thompson WorldScope database, thus rendering the 
reimbursement of taxes impossible if using equation (2a)—but not if using equation (2b). 
8 The calculated WACC level is affected by judgmental decisions regarding the length and periodicity of the periods 
included in the calculations of , a component of the capital asset-pricing model used to determine the required rate of 
return on equity, the levels of the risk-free rate and the risk spread. Moreover, required interest rates do not unambiguously 
follow from the observed annual interest payments, dependent on a company’s possible suspended or accelerated interest 
payments. 
9 We note that the implicit assumption that a unique WACC level applies to all company-year observations in the sample is 
unrealistic. Even stronger, WACC levels are even unlikely to be the same for distinct divisions/business units within 
companies (Kruger, Landier and Thesmar, 2011). Therefore, it would be reasonable to employ differential predetermined 
WACC-levels for various company-year observations, for instance dependent on the risk associated with each company in 
each year. However, it is difficult to think of uncomplicated observable characteristics that affect the variation in the 
WACC level across company-year observations and the literature appears relatively silent about the existence of such 
indicators. As long as the variation in WACC levels does not vary systematically between treatment and control companies, 
the results of our difference in difference approach are likely to remain unaffected. 


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not determine bonus levels. We therefore take as the performance measure actually studied: ∆EVA 
= EVAt - EVAt-1, with EVAt calculated on the basis of equation (1). 
 
3.2 Relative Total Shareholder Return (RTSR) as a measure of firm value 
The most widely accepted goal of (for-profit) organizations is maximization of value creation (see 
Baker 1992; Kaplan & Norton, 1996). In companies, value creation is commonly measured in terms 
of shareholder value creation, since shareholders are the residual claimants of the company. 
Shareholder value creation can be quantified either in dollar terms, by means of Market Value 
Added (MVA), or in percentages, by means of Total Shareholder Return (TSR). Both can be 
measured relative to a peer group of companies, or in absolute terms. This study uses Relative Total 
Shareholder Return (RTSR) as the relevant measure for the firms’ objective function, for three 
reasons.  First, contrary to MVA, (R)TSR includes dividend payments to shareholders, a potentially 
important source of shareholder returns. Second, absolute measures of value creation such as 
MVA are sensitive to differences in company size, whereas (R)TSR is not. Third, using RTSR 
instead of TSR allows us to control for variations in economic conditions in the different years of 
the adoption of EVA.  
 
4. CHARACTERISTICS OF EVA-ADOPTERS AND NON-ADOPTERS 
The group of 67 treated firms consists of basically all companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange that publicly communicated adoption of ∆EVA in the compensation scheme of the 
company’s board members (before 2004) and whose basic accounting and market information 
could be found. Appendix A provides the details of our data search method and includes a list of all 
treatment firms, including the year in which ∆EVA was implemented (mean 1995, median 1996). 
Seventy-one percent of the companies in the treatment group use ∆EVA as the sole measure in the 
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(short-term) incentive plan, as recommended by Stern Stewart (Stewart, 1991), whereas the average 
weight attached to EVA is 84 percent.10  
  Throughout the study, we consider two alternative time spans k (k=8 and k=10) when 
calculating the relevant statistics over period T=I {t0-k,..,t0-1} before the introduction of 
performance measure p2 = ∆EVA, and period T=II, {t0+1,..,t0+k} afterwards.
11 The determination 
of t0 is discussed in Appendix A. All statistics are calculated after removing outliers from the 
sample, defined as a company-year observation where either RTSR or ∆EVA is in the extreme 1.5 
percentile of their distributions. 
To each of the 67 treated firms, we matched a NYSE-listed control company that did not 
use an RI-based performance measure, neither in T=I nor in T=II. Following Wallace (1997), 
matching takes place based on four-digit SIC codes and company size, see Appendix A and Table 
A1. Our analyses require at least four company-year observations both before t0 and after t0 of all 
the variables in the analyses (three observations in terms of changes). This reduces the sample to 40 
treatment and 49 control firms and to 34 pairs matched on size and sector to perform all of the 
analyses.12 
As discussed, the Courty and Marschke (CM) approach suffers from a potential 
endogeneity bias. If the decision to use EVA for rewarding management performance is partly 
driven by the statistical measures that appear in the CM tests, these tests are potentially confounded 
by regression to the mean. A priori this is likely to be the case because (theoretically) the two most 
probable drivers of adopting a particular performance measure are (low) noise and (little) distortion. 
Noise is typically measured by the (time-series) variance in the performance measure due to factors 
                                                 
10 For the firms that did not use ∆EVA as their sole measure, “implementation of ∆EVA” is defined as an increase of the 
weighting of ∆EVA to at least 10%, where ∆EVA was not used before. 
11 Lower levels of k would generate a rather small number of observations for the required regressions and rather 
imprecise pre- and post-treatment statistics based on these time series. Higher k’s are difficult, due to data limitations. 
12 Paired t-tests show that the treatment and control group are not significantly different in terms of ∆EVA, RTSR, size, 
company age since IPO before the year t0., (for k=8 or k=10). Further inspection of the data shows that EVA adoption 
is not confounded or driven by CEO changes around the date of activation of the measure. 
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beyond the agent’s control (see Prendergast, 2002; Coles et al., 2006), whereas a commonly used 
(but misguided) inverse measure of distortion is the correlation between the performance measure 
and company value (see Biddle et al., 1997; Stark and Thomas, 1998; Feltham et al., 2004).13 Thus, 
one might expect that —before treatment— the average variance of ∆EVA is lower whereas the 
correlation between ∆EVA and firm value is higher for firms in the treatment group vis-à-vis firms 
in the control group.  
 
Table 1: Mean values before treatment (i.e. before t0) of Corr(∆EVA,RTSR), Std(∆EVA), and 
Cov(∆EVA,RTSR)  in treatment and control samples: Matching based on SIC/Size and Correlation 
    Mean value before treatment (T=I) 






k=8  .295 .012 .282** [.016] 
k=10  .272 .057 .215** [.036] 
Correlation 
(n=31) 
k=8  .232 .235 -.003 [.891] 
k=10  .260 .263 -.003 [.730] 
 




k=8  34.083 40.694 -6.611 [.270] 
k=10  35.925 39.069 -3.144 [.380] 
Correlation 
(n=31) 
k=8  29.076 35.153 -6.077 [.639] 






k=8  1.707 1.042 0.665 [.336] 
k=10  1.307 1.005 0.301 [.405] 
Correlation 
(n=31) 
k=8  .726 2.737 -2.011 [.102] 
k=10  .761 1.711 -.950 [.322] 
The columns labeled ‘Difference’ report the difference between the average values (of the correlation 
between ∆EVA and RTSR, the standard deviation of ∆EVA and the covariance between ∆EVA and 
RTSR, respectively) in the treatment and control group. Within squared brackets appear the p-values of 
paired t-tests that compare the means across groups (on a pair-wise basis). A significant difference at 
the 10% (5%) [1%] level is denoted by * (**) [***]. The SIC/Size matching tests are one-sided, the 
alternative hypothesis being that treatment firms have higher (pre-treatment) values of the correlation 
and the covariance, and lower values of the standard deviation. For the correlation, matched sample 
tests are double-sided. 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Baker (2002, p. 736): “… to determine whether incentive contracts should be based on accounting 
measures. […] measuring the correlation between accounting numbers and stock price is measuring the wrong thing. 
The correct measure (which is unfortunately much harder to assess) is whether accounting profits move with managers' 
actions in the same way that stock prices do.” Zimmerman (1997) shares Baker’s criticism. 
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  The upper halves of Table 1 show that the treatment group and (first) control group 
indeed differ as expected, due to self-selection in terms of the before-treatment values of the three 
key CM statistics. The one-sided pairwise t-tests in the last column of Table 1 show that the before-
treatment values of the correlation (Panel A) and covariance (Panel C) are indeed higher in the 
treatment group than in the control group, whereas the standard deviation of ∆EVA is lower in the 
treatment sample (Panel B). The only significant difference is the correlation between ∆EVA and 
RTSR (Panel A).14 
A multivariate (probit) analysis that studies the drivers of selection into the treatment 
sample supports the picture communicated in Table 1. Here, the dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to one for treatment firms and zero for control firms, whereas the set of independent 
variables includes the time-series correlation between ∆EVA and RTSR and the time-series 
standard deviation of ∆EVA. Also in this analysis, the only observed significant determinant of 
selection into the treatment sample (given a similar control sample in terms of sector, company 
size and age) is the correlation between ∆EVA and RTSR (before treatment). The higher this 
correlation is, the more likely that the performance measure is adopted. Given this, a decreasing 
correlation upon adopting the measure in the board’s reward contract may not necessarily indicate 
distortion, but may alternatively point at regression to the mean. We therefore compose a second 
control group (taken from the list of firms in the right-hand part of Table A1 in Appendix A for 
which we have enough information).15 Firms in this group are matched pairwise to firms in the 
treatment group on the sole basis of the pre-treatment correlation between ∆EVA and RTSR, 
separately for k=8 and k=10.16 This k-specific matching serves as a guarantee that each pair 
consists of a treatment- and a control firm whose pre-treatment correlations between ∆EVA and 
RTSR do not differ by more than 0.1. The resulting correlation-based matched samples (for k=8 
                                                 
14 Table B1 in online Appendix B shows that these results are similar when using alternative measures of ∆EVA, based 
on alternative definitions of NOPAT or alternative WACC levels. 
15 Observations omitted from the first SIC/Size matched sample (treatment or control) due to missing data for the 
counterpart (in terms of SIC/Size), are reconsidered for inclusion in the second (pre-correlation matches) sample.  
16 Exact propensity score matching is unnecessary, as matching is based on one explanatory variable.  
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and k=10) are somewhat limited in size due to the different distributions in the two samples of 
the pre-treatment correlations. We must omit firms with very high pre-treatment correlations from 
the treatment sample and firms with very low correlations from the control group. The resulting 
sample size is 31 matched pairs for both k=8 and k=10.17 
 The lower halves of Table 1 show that the differences between the treatment- and this 
matched control group are indeed negligible in the pre-treatment period t0k to t01 in terms of 
the key CM statistics for both k=8 and k=10.18 Therefore, we think it is useful to present in 
Section 5 the results of the CM tests based on a comparison of both the first (SIC/Size-based) and 
the second (correlation-based) set of treatment- and control firm pairs.  
 
5. EVIDENCE OF DISTORTIONS AND GAMING 
This section tests for the presence of distortions in ∆EVA, using tests (CM.1) and (CM.2) from 
Section 2.19 Table 2 reports the correlation levels between ∆EVA and RTSR before and after 
activation of the performance measure for both sets of treatment-control samples and for both 
time spans k. The right-hand side reports the difference between the correlations after and before 
treatment (Corr) and the difference-in-differences between the treatment and the control group 
(2Corr=[Corr]Treatment–[Corr]Control). Hence, this last column is the one that indicates whether or not 
there is evidence of distortion according to test (CM.1). 
  
                                                 
17 Paired t-tests show that this matched control group is also not significantly different from the treatment group in terms 
of ∆EVA, RTSR, size, company age since IPO before the year t0., (for k=8 or k=10). Further inspection of the data 
shows that EVA adoption is not confounded or driven by CEO changes around the date of activation of the measure. 
18 This test is two-sided, given the alternative hypothesis that the two samples have different average values of the pre-
treatment correlations (unlike the expectations for the SIC/Size matched sample), without prior expectations about the sign 
of the difference. 
19 These tests are also performed for the alternative measures of ∆EVA based on different calculations of NOPAT and 
different WACC levels, with the results reported in online Appendix B. In all cases the findings for the alternative 
measurements are comparable to those reported here. 
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Table 2: Testing for the degradation of the correlation coefficient Corr(∆EVA,RTSR) (test (CM.1)) 















Corr   
[p-value] 




k=8  .295 .070 -.225*** 
[0.005] 




k=10  .272 .080 -.193*** 
[0.007] 






k=8  .232 .006 -.226** 
[0.012] 




k=10  .260 .049 -.211*** 
[0.010] 
 .263 .144 -.119* 
[0.077] 
 -.093   
[0.135] 
The p-values reported in square brackets are based on a one-sided paired t-test, and confirm the expectation 
that the decrease of the correlation levels is larger in the treatment group than in the group of control firms. A 
significant difference at the 10% (5%) [1%] level is denoted by * (**) [***]. DID refers to difference-in-
differences.  
 
The results support distortion of the performance measure ∆EVA. The correlation between 
∆EVA and RTSR decreases significantly in the treatment group, but (typically) not in the matched 
control group. The difference-in-differences are large and mostly significant. They are smaller, 
however, for the correlation-based treatment-control comparisons than for the SIC/Size-based 
treatment-control comparisons. This indicates that regression to the mean explains part of the 
decreased correlation between ∆EVA and RTSR once ∆EVA is implemented. Yet regression to 
the mean is certainly not the single driving force, as is indicated by the significantly negative 
estimates of 2Corr for the correlation-matched sample of pairs (when k=8). Degradation plays an 
important role as well. Overall, Table 2 thus provides plausible evidence for the distortion of 
∆EVA as a performance measure.  
In online Appendix C we investigate the changes in the slope coefficient from regressing 
RTSR on ∆EVA as an alternative test of distortion and obtain exactly the same conclusion. The 
evidence in favor of distortion is thus robust. 
  Distortion may either point at suboptimal amounts of productive effort, or at 
unproductive gaming activities detrimental to firm value. Evidence of whether gaming plays a role 
is obtained by applying test (CM.2.) that measures the change in the covariance. The results 
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reported in Table 3 display a clear pattern in support of gaming: the reductions in the covariances in 
the treatment group are significantly greater than the comparable reductions in the control group. 
This holds for both matching methods and for both levels of k.  
 
Table 3: Testing for the degradation of the covariance Cov(∆EVA,RTSR) (test (CM.2)) 















Cov        
[p-value] 




k=8  1.707 0.929 -0.778 
[0.289] 




k=10  1.307 0.675 -0.632 
[0.296] 






k=8  0.726 -0.148 -0.874      
[0. 254] 




k=10  0.761 -0.473 - 1.234* 
[0.091] 




The p-values reported in square brackets are based on a one-sided paired t-test, and confirm the expectation 
that the decrease of the covariance levels is larger in the treatment group than in the group of control firms. A 
significant difference at the 10% (5%) [1%] level is denoted by * (**) [***]. Significant differences opposite to 
the expected direction are denoted by # (##)[###].. DID refers to difference-in-differences. 
 
 Using a decrease in the covariance to detect gaming assumes that incentives are not 
weakened over time (see test (CM.2) in Section 2). This assumption is likely to be met for our 
sample. Murphy (2012) shows strong evidence of the increased incentive intensity for US based 
listed firms between 1992-2011. His Figures 2.4 and 2.5 reveal that the fraction of variable pay in 
overall pay has significantly increased over time..20 We are thus fairly confident that this holds for 
our sample as well. 
                                                 
20 Measuring incentive intensities is not straightforward and the various measures that are commonly used all point in the 
same direction: the incentive intensity of CEOs has increased across the board in the period of our study. CEOs effective 
ownership of stock as % of total number of shares outstanding (i.e. Jensen and Murphy (1990)’s pay performance 
sensitivity measure) steadily increased from 1992 to 2004, just as CEOs “equity at stake” did, i.e. CEOs change in wealth 
for a 1% change in the value of the firm, see Figures 2.8 and 2.9 in Murphy (2012). Frydman and Saks (2010, Figure 6) 
also observe a strong and steady increase in both Hall and Liebman (1998)’s equity at stake and Jensen and Murphy’s pay 
performance sensitivity from 1980 to 2005. 
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All in all, we conclude that the performance measure ∆EVA is distorted. Our results 
suggest that part of this distortion is due to gaming of the performance measure by board 
members. The changes in statistical association between ∆EVA and firm value upon 
incorporating ∆EVA in the board’s remuneration plan are also driven by regression to the mean. 
Correcting the CM tests for self-selection is thus imperative. 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Accounting research has traditionally assessed the quality of performance measures based on the 
association between the measured value of the performance measure and some indicator of the 
firm’s objective function. Residual Income-based performance measures—and Economic Value 
Added in particular—have been subject to such evaluations, leading to mixed results (e..g Biddle et 
al., 1997; Chen and Dodd, 1997; Feltham et al., 2004; O’Byrne, 1997; Stark and Thomas, 1998; 
Wallace 1997). More recently, however, Baker (2002) has shown that what matters is not the 
association between the levels of the performance measure and the company’s objective function, 
but rather the association between the marginal effects of effort on these two metrics. Unfortunately, 
the association between these margins as a (inverse) measure of distortion is harder to assess. Courty 
and Marschke (2008) recently developed a suitable empirical test to detect distortion in 
performance measures. This paper applies their test to the (accounting based value of the) 
performance measure EVA, a Residual Income-based performance measure widely used in 
corporate practice. The test is adapted in order to cope with self-selection and timing decisions. In 
particular, we take a difference-in-differences approach, where the control group consists of a 
matched sample of suitably selected firms.  
  Overall, our test results indicate that the accounting based value of EVA is a distorted 
performance measure. Differences (in differences) are somewhat more pronounced when the 
treatment-control group pairs consist of firms that are similar in terms of industry and size than 
when pairs are formed based on similar pre-treatment correlations between RTSR and ∆EVA (the 
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main driver of self-selection into the treatment). This indicates that regression to the mean explains 
part of the decrease in correlation between RTSR and ∆EVA after the activation of EVA. Yet the 
significant differences that we observe for our second control group reveal that degradation plays a 
key role as well. Moreover, under the reasonable assumption that overall incentives have not 
weakened over time (cf. Murphy, 2012, Frydman and Saks, 2010), our finding that the covariance 
between RTSR and ∆EVA decreases more for the treatment firms supports gaming. There is, thus, 
reasonable evidence that the distortions detected are partly due to gaming.  
  Our finding that EVA is a distorted performance begs the question exactly how it can be 
gamed. The empirical accounting literature tentatively suggests that managers may engage in 
‘earnings management’ and ‘short-termism’ to artificially boost current EVA at the expense of 
future EVA. First, using EVA may give managers incentives to manipulate when actual 
accounting profits are reported, as to influence pay that depend on reported earnings (Healy, 1985; 
Young and O’Byrne, 2001).21 Second, distortions may arise from EVA being a short-term, single-
period performance measure. Managers may want to avoid negative EVA projects—even if these 
projects are profitable in the long run (see Bromwich and Walker, 1998; O’Hanlon and Peasnell, 
1998). In line with this, Wallace (1997) finds suggestive evidence that managers whose rewards are 
EVA-based may actually under-invest in projects that render a positive net present value relative to 
managers whose rewards are based on more traditional (earnings-based) performance measures. 
Relative to non-adopters, EVA-adopters dispose of more assets and decrease their new 
investments, whereas they use their remaining assets more intensively.22  
  A potential interesting avenue for future research would be to complement our general 
                                                 
21 The incentive to manage earnings is provoked by the use of upper limits to restrict bonus payments, although this 
practice counters the recommendations of Stern Stewart & Co. 
22 As noted by Wallace (1997, p. 287), it is difficult to establish whether the observed changes in behavior are value-
decreasing. Rogerson (1997) and Reichelstein (1997) show that, theoretically, EVA-based compensation can provide 
first-best investment incentives if depreciation schedules are chosen such that investment costs are spread out over the 
investment’s lifetime exactly proportionally to the benefits. The intuition is that EVA then reflects the value created by 
the manager at any given point in time.   
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test based on Courty and Marschke (2008) with an analysis of accounting information to test for 
some of the specific ways of gaming discussed above. If specific gaming activities could be 
empirically identified for our sample of firms, this would reinforce our conclusions. At the same 
time, there are likely to be numerous ways in which a performance measure can be manipulated, 
and managers may be very creative in findings the more opaque ways to do so. The general test of 
Courty and Marschke has the advantage that distortions can be detected without being omniscient 
of all the possible ways in which a measure can be gamed. 
As noted in the Introduction, our findings do not imply that EVA is a poor performance 
measure. First, our empirical analysis has little to say about the economic relevance of the distortion 
identified in terms of efficiency losses. This would require observing the counterfactual, i.e. changes 
in firm value under fist best incentives. Second, our analysis is unable to make comparisons of the 
distortions and thus the relative welfare losses when any other performance measure is used. 
Another interesting topic for future research would therefore be to extend the Courty and 
Marschke (2008) approach to find ways in which the distortions detected in different performance 
measures could be meaningfully compared. In the end it may be more valuable to know which out 
of several available measures is least subject to gaming (in terms of efficiency losses), than just 
establishing that a given measure can be gamed. 
  22  
Appendix A  Data 
 
RTSR  
The RTSR of firm j in year t (RTSRj,t) is obtained by normalizing the TSR of this firm in year t with 
the TSR of the S&P500 index in that year: 
 
         
 
Here, I denotes the stock index provided by the Thompson Datastream database, and is calculated 
as the return on a company’s stock, including price changes, dividend payouts, the effects of stock 
splits, stock shares and so forth.23 Subscript m refers to the market, j refers to a firm and t is a year 
index. The fiscal year that includes the month in which the performance measure was implemented 
in the (matched) treatment firm is recorded as the year t0.
  
 
Selection of treatment firms 
To identify the population of ∆EVA-adopters, we used three sources: (i) a list composed by Stern  
Stewart & Co., taken from their company report: “The comparative stock market performance of 
Stern Stewart Clients”, (ii) the sample of treatment firms in Wallace (1997),24 and (iii) a search 
through the encompassing EDGAR database of the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
using keywords “EVA” and “Economic Value Added”.25 The combined lists provided 149 
companies that adopted ∆EVA for performance measurement. An analysis of the individual 
proxy statements of these firms revealed that 74 of them explicitly adopted ∆EVA as a basis for 
                                                 
23 In accordance with general practice, stock indices are evaluated over a period of three months, which smoothes the 
influence of the day-by-day volatility of the stock market.   
24 Wallace (1997) focuses on residual income-based compensation plans. We selected the EVA users from his sample based 
on the assessment of companies’ proxy statements. 
25 EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system, performs automated collection, validation, 
indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by companies that are required by law to file forms with the Securities 
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board member remuneration.26 For seven of these companies none of the crucial accounting or 
market data was available at all. This resulted in 67 treatment firms (see Table A1 below).  
 
Determining the treatment start and end 
The exact implementation year t0 for each treatment firm was deduced from their proxy 
statements. Most of the firms explicitly mentioned the date of implementation. For example: “In 
July 1996, the Committee approved modifications to the Executive Incentive Plan effective for the 
fiscal year beginning October 1, 1996.” (Becton Dickinson & Co, DEF14A statement Fiscal Year 
2007). 
We also checked if and when EVA-adopters abandoned the use of this measure as part 
of the compensation contract later on. Roughly 58% did so in the 11 years (at most) that we 
observed after the measure’s introduction—on average, after 7.5 years. Thus, only relatively few 
company-year observations are involved (approximately 7%). These observations are set to 
missing values in the regressions for the relevant treatment-control pairs. The results are 
qualitatively similar when we ignore the elimination of the performance measure.  
 
Selection of matched control firms in the first (SIC/Size) control sample 
As in Wallace (1997), firms are first matched on the 4-digit SIC code. Next, the firm that is closest 
in size is selected as control. Size is measured by sales volume in the year prior to the treatment 
firm’s adoption of ∆EVA (i.e. year t01). In some cases this matching procedure fails to allocate a 
suitable control firm—for instance, due to an insufficient number of years of data available, large 
temporal disparities in the fiscal year ending, or large size differences.27 In these cases, matching 
takes place on 3-digit, or in a few cases even two-digit SIC codes. Two firms were used twice as a 
control firm. We treat these as independent observations in the analyses.  
                                                 
26 Kleiman (1999) followed a similar search procedure with slightly different criteria and obtained a set of 71 EVA-
adopters.  
27 The longitudinal nature of the study disqualifies firms that enter and exit the stock market, go bankrupt, are taken over or 
split up in the period of the study. 
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Table A1: Companies in the treatment- and control group 
Treatment company Activation year SIC Paired control-group company 
Coca Cola Company 1983 2086 Pepsico Inc 
Grainger WW Inc 1989 5000 Allied Waste Industries Inc 
Briggs & Stratton Corp. 1990 3510 Caterpillar 
Crane Company 1990 3490 Parker-Hannifin Corp. 
Ball Corp. 1991 3411 Crown Holdings Inc 
Manitowoc Company Inc 1993 3531 Alico Inc 
Milacron Inc 1993 3559 Wellco Enterprises Inc 
Acxiom Corp. 1994 7374 Total System Services Inc 
Centura Banks Inc 1994 6022 Doral Financial 
Donnelley RR & Sons Company 1994 2754 Interpublic Group Companies Inc 
Fleming Cos Inc 1994 5141 Performance Food Group Company 
Georgia Pacific Corp. 1994 2400 Glatfelter 
Jarden Corp. 1994 4783 American Greetings Corp. 
Maritrans Partners 1994 4499 Sea Containers Limited 
PerkinElmer Inc 1994 3841 Applera Corp. 
Ablest Inc 1995 7361 National Technical Systems Inc 
Aquila Inc 1995 4922 El Paso Corp. 
Armstrong Holdings Inc 1995 3996 Interface Inc 
Becton Dickinson & Company 1995 3841 3M Company 
ELI Lilly & Company 1995 2834 Abbott Laboratories Inc 
Great Plains Energy Inc 1995 4911 Ohio Power Company 
Guidant Corp. 1995 3845 Fischer Imaging Corp. 
Inacom Corp. 1995 5045 En Pointe Technology Inc 
Lyondell Chemical Company 1995 2869 Dow Chemicals Company 
Officemax Incorporated 1995 5943 Staples Inc 
Tektronix Inc 1995 3825 COHU Inc 
ADC Telecommunications Inc 1996 3661 Arris Group Inc 
Avery Dennison Corp. 1996 2891 Cytec Industries 
Bausch & Lomb Inc 1996 3851 Oakley Inc 
Bowater Inc 1996 2621 Glatfelter 
GC Cos Inc 1996 7832 Carmike Cinemas Inc 
Johnson Outdoors Inc 1996 3792 Fleetwood Enterprises 
K-Swiss Inc 1996 5139 Kenneth Cole Productions Inc 
Kimball International Inc 1996 2517 Ethan Allen Interiors Corp 
Magnetek Inc 1996 3679 BTU International 
Marathon Oil Corp. 1996 2911 Hess Corp. 
Millennium Chemicals Inc 1996 2899 PPG Industries Inc 
Miller (Herman) Inc 1996 2522 Flexsteel Industries 
Murphy Oil Corp. 1996 2911 Frontier Oil Corp. Commerce 
Olin Corp. 1996 3341 Rockwood Holdings Inc 
Polaroid Corp. 1996 3827 Cooper Companies Inc 
SPX Corp. 1996 3823 Ametek Inc 
SVB Financial Group 1996 6021 Alabama National BanCorporation 
Tupperware Brands Corp. 1996 3089 Aptargroup Inc 
Vulcan Materials Corp. 1996 1422 MDU Resources Group Inc 
Allied Holdings Inc 1997 4213 Covenant Transport Inc 
Columbus McKinnon Corp. 1997 3536 Alamo Group Inc 
Federal Mogul Corp. 1997 3713 Dana Corp. 
Material Sciences Corp. 1997 3479 Lindsay Corporation 
MDI Inc 1997 3829 Mechanical Technology Inc 
Noble Corp. 1997 1381 Abraxas Petroleum Corp 
Penney JC Company Inc 1997 5311 Federated Department Stores Inc 
Ryder System Inc 1997 7513 Amerco 
Tenet Healthcare Corp. 1997 8062 Universal Health Services Inc 
Tenneco Inc 1997 3714 BorgWarner Inc 
Touch America Holdings Inc 1997 4899 Ohio Power Company 
Webster Financial Corp. 1997 6021 Downey Financial Corp. 
Whirlpool Corp. 1997 3630 Centex Corp. 
Wolohan Lumber CO. 1997 5211 Building Materials Holdings Corp. 
Great Lakes Chem. Corp. 1998 2819 Church & Dwight 
ITT Corporation 1998 3812 General Dynamics 
Servicemaster Company 1998 0782 Central Garden & PET Company 
Standard Motor Products Inc 1998 3694 Motorcar Parts Of America 
Worthington Industries Inc 1998 3312 AK Steel holdings 
Best Buy Company Inc 1999 5731 Circuit City Inc 
Genesco Inc 1999 5661 Brown Shoe Inc 
Int Multifood Corporation 2001 5149 McCormick & Company Inc 
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